[203 cont.]

*648 The order given in this letter was not carried out. On the contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave orders that the Kalmuks as well as the Kazaks were to be prevented from crossing the Ural to attack each other.

[726] It must be supposed that the government changed its mind because of the troubles which broke out at that time on the Siberian frontier. The Dzungarian kungtaidji suddenly advanced with his troops toward the Russian border, and his subjects began to threaten the garrisons with war, while the rumor spread that he wished to attack the establishments of Kolyvano-Voskresensk, where he was attracted by the mines of precious metals.

At this time the Dzungars were still formidable, and an attack by them could not be compared to the raids of the Kazaks. Therefore it was indispensable to prepare adequate forces against them. As a result the insolence of the Kazaks was forgotten, and Nepluev received an order (1) to persuade them to

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 3, 1744.

make raids against the Dzungars.

It was a difficult task to carry out. Khan Abulkhair still [186] held resentment against Russia in spite of the indulgence granted for his crimes. Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, retreated toward Turkestan in order to avoid Abulkhair's intrigues, and thus practically put an end to his relations with the border authorities. Besides he had less need for the help of Russia than the protection of the kungtaidji of the Dzungars, who held his son as hostage. [662] Finally, Abul Mahmet sought to be khan at Turkestan, and this city recognized the authority of Galdan Tsyren.

[664] [204] Sultan Barak, who had sworn allegiance to Russia two years earlier, lived far from her border, and fearing the Dzungars more than the Russians, he, like Abul Mahmet, had given his son to Galdan Tsyren as hostage.

[662] The latter sought to attach the sultans and the common people of the Middle Horde to himself by every means. To attain

[204 cont.]
[649] [662] this he used threats and favors by turns, and finally he bought various Russian articles at his own expense which he had sold to the horde, not only without profit but even at a loss.

[186] Although the circumstances were so opposed to the views of the Russian government, yet the hereditary and inveterate hate of the Kazaks for the Dzungars still had enough power to keep them from being entirely indifferent to the hints of the Russians. They preferred to leave their border in peace rather than neglect the opportunity to attack their perpetual enemies, who at this time threatened to reduce them to complete subservience. In spite of their submission to Galdan Tsyren, the khans and sultans feared his domination more than that of the Russians. However, they took part with the people in the preparations for hostilities which were being made. The tribes of the Middle Horde, who were still suffering from the ravages committed against them in 1741, almost under the walls of Orenburg, were the most anxious to help the Russian troops. They were only waiting for the opening of war between them and the Dzungars, and at the first news of the beginning of hostilities they would have thrown themselves upon the settlements of their enemies with all the fury of semi-primitive people. But their hopes were dashed, for the Dzungars, in spite of their threats, left Russia in peace. This was the only way the Kazaks could have avoided the storm which threatened them, for in spite of all the patience with which the Russian government had borne their raids on the border for more than a year, it had been firmly decided to use the troops [205] stationed on the Orenburg line and others to be added to them in order to punish the Kazaks severely.

During the interval, Sultan Khodja Akhmet, who until then had been detained as hostage in the fort at Sarachinsk, was transferred to St. Petersburg. Although Abulkhair could not have been [152] happy to see his son taken further away when he wished him closer, and although he was furiously angry with Nepluev and allowed [721] himself new violence in his relations with him, still his subjects

[208 cont.]
100 men, and led away an enormous number of livestock.

After this celebrated expedition, several small raids took place on the Russian border.

Khan Abulkhair was still the cause of these new plunderings. He continued to nurse a deep hatred of Nepluev and was angry because the government had not satisfied his complaints against the border authorities and had not given up his son Khodja Akhmet. For this reason he adopted the course of wreaking his vengeance against all the Russians. Not content with the wrong he had committed against Russia through the raids of his subjects, he took the advice of the latter and abused an interpreter whom Nepluev had sent to him with papers, did not let him out of sight, and detained him for about a year, tormenting him in different ways.

It was still too little. Abulkhair's fury was so blind that he sought to persuade his people to depart from Russia and go south into the sands and the waterless deserts. But the Kazaks knew the advantages of the lands neighboring Russia, and they openly refused to obey him in this case. His rage then fell upon those of his subjects who had opposed his plan to move, and he wrote to the border authorities to arrest these people when they entered fortified localities, as the fomenters of all the disturbances.

While he was thus delivering the innocent to punishment, he was preparing the true brigands for a new attack against the Volga Kalmuks and was only waiting for winter to send them off. In January, 1747, when the ice was strong enough on the Caspian Sea, they left their camps, successfully crossed [209] the ice opposite the mouth of the Ural River, and attacked the uluses of their enemies once again. But this time fortune betrayed them: the Kalmuks had been warned of the attack in time and retreated into the western part of their steppes. They were too far away, and it was too dangerous to pursue them; thus the bandits returned with empty hands. Then, to complete their misfortune, the ice began to melt, the passage across the ice became difficult, and they were obliged to cross the Ural River where the Yaik Cossacks, who had been sent against them, were waiting. The passage through the Russian troops was very costly, for when they had reached their shore, many dead were found there, and a greater number drowned in the river, for the ice had broken. Most of their horses fell into the hands of the Russians.

European KalmyK RF4
KalmyK (Oirat) AA5

EK KO [253 cont.]
648 after having taken counsel with the princes and the lamas (priests),
K 648 he fixed the time of departure for the time when the Volga should
EK KO be covered with ice. This arrangement was necessary because,
[167 although Ubashi himself was on the left bank of the river, a
668] large part of the Torguts were on the right bank and could not
join him with what they possessed except by crossing the ice.

This is why a [254] large part of the inhabitants of Astrakhan are still composed of Kalmuks today. For the winter of 1770 was warm and the rivers of southern Russia did not freeze, and Ubashi, after waiting in vain until the month of January for the Kalmuks from the right bank to join him, was obliged to abandon them and to leave with only those who were on the left bank.

They departed on the fifth of January, numbering 30,000 tents (1).

1. This is what Rychkov's journal says, but the Geographical Dictionary of the Russian Empire puts it at only 28,162.

As they approached the Yaik /Ural River/, the governor of
K EK KO Orenburg warned Khan Nurali that they were going to attack the
[662] Kazaks. Consequently, in the name of the supreme government, he granted Nurali the right to fight against them and to take as much booty from them as he could, on condition that they then be made to return to their former places of abode within our borders. The government of the borders of Siberia transmitted the same advice to the Middle Horde through Sultan Ablai and other chiefs. In order to confirm these declarations, on
EK KO January 27, 1771 an imperial letter patent was presented in the name of Nurali and all the Kazak people to seize the Torguts.

●K Every kind of instigation or advice was quite superfluous
[721 for the accomplishment of such designs. Every Kazak considered
●186] the chance to contribute to their execution a special bit of good fortune. Stirred with a violent hatred for all the Kalmuk descent groups, a heritage from their fathers and their most distant

European Kalmyk RF4
Kalmyks (Oirat) AH5

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[254 cont.]

ancestors, they hastened out to fight against them and despoil them. In less than a month the Kazak hordes were under arms, and the entire length of the country, from the shores of the Yaik to the borders of China, was covered with bands of warriors waiting impatiently for the appearance of a people whom the Kazaks burned to immolate for injuries suffered and for the hatred they aroused simply by their name and their origin. Nurali replied to the letter patent that he was not only ready to comply [255] with the wishes of the Russian government but that he was already on the march with his subjects against the fugitives. At the same time news was received that Ablai and his horde were ready for combat. Aichuvak and other sultans wrote in the same vein, and Kaip, who had been khan of Khiva and who lived within the Little Horde after his expulsion by his subjects, promised to join the Russian troops. East of the Kazak steppes, the Kalmuks were awaited by the Sultans Abulfenz, son of Abulkhair Khan, and Erali, sultan of the Great Horde, and finally by the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, who surpassed all the neighboring peoples in daring and ferociousness.

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What a terrible series of battles the Torguts had to endure! What a succession of attacks, murders, and robberies occurred on their route all the way to their destination on the banks of the Ili, traveling not with an army always ready to fight, but taking along with them their wives, children, herds, and all their possessions!

Several detachments of Russian troops were immediately detailed to restrain the Kazaks, but various circumstances prevented them from acting in a manner which corresponded to the hope of the government. From then on all hope was lost of seizing the Kalmuks, and the arming of all the Kazak hordes served only to exterminate a large part of the Torguts, without contributing in any way to their return to Russia.

The first barrier which should have been opposed to them was the army of the Ural (Yaik) Cossacks, whose lands they crossed. After the Kalmuks had passed, the Cossacks were firmly ordered to pursue them, but they rebelled and openly refused to leave their homes.

[264 cont.]

X 748 643 The election of Vali by Ablai's Kazak subjects and his confirmation by Russia did not prevent another khan from appearing in the same horde. He was chosen by the Naiman descent line and confirmed by the emperor of China. The descendants of the ancient Naimans, who had blended into the mass of the Kazak people of the time, obeyed, at the time of Ablai, Sultan Abulfenz, son of Abul Mahmet and brother of Pulat, the khan of Turkestan. And although he had had some relations with the Orenburg authorities and had even requested a stipend, he was nevertheless a subject of China. He died in 1783, leaving a son named Bupu and a son-in-law, Khan Khodja, son of Barak, whose acquaintance we have already made. One of these princes was to inherit Abulfenz's authority, but each had his partisans, who could not come to an agreement on the choice and who set the entire Naiman descent group in commotion with their quarrels. The majority of the votes were in favor of Khan Khodja, however, so that this prince became the sovereign of the former subjects of Abulfenz, and the troubles were ended. When the emperor of China learned this, he sent him a certificate as khan by one of his high officials. The ministry in Peking considered this a necessary measure because it regarded the entire Middle Horde as subjects of China and because it had named Ablai a Chinese prince. When it was seen that Ablai's son Vali was submitting [662] himself to Russia, he was speedily replaced, for the dignity of the empire, by another Kazak prince who was submissive.

X 748 With the exception of Vali, the other sons and close kinsmen of Ablai had few relations with Russia. Some of them proudly acknowledged themselves to be subjects of China.

This was the behavior adopted by Sultan Chingis, who [265] marched in 1784 with an army raised in the steppes to put down a revolt which had broken out in Tashkent. Another brother of [686] Khan Vali, Sultan Tyz, who was also devoted to China, is known to us only for his hatred of the Buruts.

Tyz was not the only one to attack his bloodthirsty neighbors. [721] Several sections or branches of the Kazaks who lived near the Chinese borders continued to maintain the war against the Buruts

[279 cont.]

After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities, mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes. He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in everything with the organization of the provinces of the interior and to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their inactivity and once more began their old disputes, driven from one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

These internal circumstances were joined by others which acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

"To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey, Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

[281 cont.]
to all the servants of God and followers of Mohammed who trust in the protection of Our Prophet, to join the Turkish army with goods and with sentiments, and to go and strike the infidels. This is a matter for which a great reward can be obtained. And if in this war anyone fails to do all the harm possible to the infidels, he must fear the great anger of God, and may not hope for the protection of Our Prophet. Besides, we beg that there should be faith in the words of the envoy.

"We learn that you Kazaks do not have your own wise and learned men, and for this reason you cannot carry out the laws of Our Prophet at all. And since the Lord God has commanded that his principles be known and that prayers be offered in conformity to his principles, fasting he observed, and alms be given of one's possessions, then the knowledge of letters in order to read books belongs to the service of God. There is a source of wisdom among us today. For from all the peoples, including the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Arabs, and Turkmen, there are many who study in our schools, but from you, who are such a numerous people, there is not a single student. In the Koran, Our Prophet has prescribed that every believer, not only the husband and the wife, but the small children as well, should study the law and fear God and that when they are able, they should inform others. For this reason we advise you to send here two or three men from each tribe to be instructed. If they will not listen to your urging, then take two or three men from each tribe by force. They will receive their subsistence from us, and when they will have finished their studies and are skillful in the law, they will return to their homes with the principles of piety and the habit of prayers and fasting. And if you have the means of carrying out our proposal, O Kazak people, and leave it without execution, then [282] you will become traitors to God in this world, and on the day of resurrection you will burn in the fires of hell. If we did not offer this truth for your consideration, we ourselves would deserve the name of infidels in this world, and we should expose ourselves in the future world to the eternal fires of hell.

[282 cont.]

"In closing, we are respectfully, in the year of the Hegira 1202 (1788 after the birth of Jesus Christ)."

To this letter was affixed the black seal of the atalyk of Bukhara (first minister of Shah Murat).

Syrym, in spite of his ties with the Orenburg authorities, replied to the atalyk that he himself and his followers were ready to obey the commandments of God, but that they could not begin the war until the Bukharans and the other Asiatic peoples had entered Russia.

This step came to the knowledge of the Russian government, and Syrym began to be suspected and his duplicity discovered, and all confidence in him was lost. On his part, he did not wish to suffer humiliation, and although he still seemed devoted for a certain time, at the same time he no longer seemed so disposed to agree with the views of the Orenburg government. Meanwhile his followers were again pillaging Russia as before. The raids on the borders increased daily. The disputes became much stronger in the horde. While the sultans and part of the people demanded a khan, the elders charged with supervising the conduct of the people, as well as the members of the tribunals, did not carry out anything, never met, did not look into matters, did not come to Orenburg except to collect their stipends, and had no influence over the horde.

In this state of affairs there was no longer anything else to do but to return to the old administration and to re-establish the position of khan. An auspicious pretext was offered for this re-establishment when Nurali, at his death, commanded, among his last wishes to his children, that they remain faithful to Russia.

[283] The Russian government's sole desire to designate a new khan for the Little Horde was a bolt of lightning to Syrym and stripped off the mask with which he had covered himself. When he saw his most cherished hopes destroyed and had lost all his importance, he no longer had the will or the need to restrain himself. For this reason he returned to his early pursuits and once more openly began to act as a brigand.

The fact that positions of responsibility are filled by Slavs means that they are almost the only ones in Kazakhstan to be seen enjoying the material rewards so conspicuously granted to members of the Soviet elites. Regardless of whose fault this may be, it must at times breed resentment among the Kazakhs. Similarly, the preponderance of Slavs in higher governmental, Party, executive, and judicial positions means that the Kazakhs are almost never governed, judged, or defended by their fellows. It must often happen that Kazakhs who feel they are the victims of injustice identify this as discrimination.

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NATIONALITY POLICY

KN 563

Soviet policy toward the minority nationalities within the USSR has also created a long-standing dilemma in the case of the Kazakhs—a dilemma which appears to provide an important vulnerability for psychological warfare exploitation. This policy strives to create national political units which are "socialist in content, national in form." This means in effect that the political structure and economy of the various national groups are organized along standard Soviet lines and their energies are directed toward Soviet objectives, but the symbols of nationality (particularly the local languages) are retained to grant a sense of continuity with past traditions. The devising and implementing of this policy was the earliest responsibility assumed by Stalin under Lenin's guidance. It has had varying degrees of success in different areas, but in the balance has proved to be a very useful tool of Soviet administration.

The Kazakhs, however, are a people still too deeply attached to their old life and its traditions and values to accept mere lip service to their national heritage. Every time an effort has been made to raise Kazakh morale and productivity by permitting public attention to national heroes and literature, the result has been an enthusiasm the Soviets have viewed as threatening. This was particularly true when, during World War II, national patriotism was extensively exploited throughout the USSR to inspire the people to defend their homeland. Among the Kazakhs this developed into a cult glorifying their native heroes and culture, a phenomenon which had also appeared during the 1920's and had grown until it became such a threat that it was ruthlessly suppressed by the Soviets. After the war Kazakh nationalism, left unsuppressed, continued to grow in strength until finally in the 1950's a purge was required to check its growing force.

K [186] 668

It seems certain that these sentiments will lie for a long time close beneath the surface, available for mobilization through psychological warfare, regardless of the turns Soviet nationality policy might take in the event of another war. For this reason, considerable attention has been devoted in this report to Kazakh history, including its national heroes, and to Kazakh cultural values and traditions.

K 121

One method which the Soviets employ to make the minority republics "national in form" is the utilization wherever possible of native Communists to fill positions in the local Party and government. As might be expected, in the Kazakh SSR there is a chronic shortage of

KN 563 665

THE PERIOD 1926-1939

At the end of the 1920's the Soviets decided to collectivize the nomads of Central Asia, by which they meant causing them to settle down in collective farms. The first Five-Year Plan envisaged settling 383,000 of these nomadic households by 1933. By 1930, 50,000 nomadic Kazakh households were so immobilized, but 567,000 out of 829,000 households, or 67 per cent, were still nomadic. During the following year, 95,000 more households were transferred from nomadism to farming and other sedentary occupations. In 1932 an intensive drive was started to collectivize the nomadic herdsmen as well, but without compulsory sedentarization; collectivization no longer meant settling down.

Apparently, many of those nomads who had been sedentarized in the first Five-Year Plan did not remain on the farms. Kazakhs traditionally abhorred farming. They regarded it as woman's work, as work of the poor and of those who could not make a success of herding. For a man to become a farmer meant loss of status, loss of manhood and virility. The Sarts, for example, a farming and trading people of Central Asia composed of former herdsmen, were despised by the nomads. Only half of those households which had been announced as collectivized remained so. In 1934, it was announced that only 76,000 households of the 145,000 noted above had been permanently settled in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935 slightly under 200,000 households were added to this roll, making a total of about one quarter of a million households which had been sedentarized. In addition, there was some movement of nomad households across the border into other republics or into China. In 1935 there were 158,000 fully nomadic Kazakh households, as compared with 567,000 five years earlier.

The total number of those employed in Kazakhstan in 1931 was 495,100, of whom 125,100 were in agriculture. By 1935 the total figure had risen to 585,700, and the agricultural component to 165,800. The total figure rose to about 700,000 in 1937 and to 820,000 in 1940.

There were 16,184 persons employed in industry in Kazakhstan in 1927, of whom 20.8 per cent were Kazakhs. In 1933, the number of industrial workers had risen to 56,484; of these, 23,784, or 42.1 per cent, were Kazakhs. At the end of 1934, the total was 71,627, of whom 29,022 or 40.5 per cent were Kazakhs.

The total population of Kazakhs was reported in 1926 as 3,968,289; in 1939 their number was given as 3,098,764. They had thus lost in absolute terms about 900,000 people between the two censuses, or approximately 22 per cent of their number in 1926. In the same period, the population of the entire USSR had increased by 15.9 per cent. It has been argued that under normal conditions the Kazakh rate of increase would have been higher than the average for the USSR as a whole. (The populations of the neighboring republics of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, for instance, which are composed of ethnic groups similar to the Kazakhs, have increased at a rate much higher than that of the entire USSR.) At any rate, if the Kazakhs had increased only at the USSR average rate, they would have numbered about 4,500,000 in 1939. Thus their real loss

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

life of the republic. There is reason to doubt the population picture provided by Soviet figures. Since polygamy is illegal in the Soviet Union, polygamous marriages are carefully concealed from the Soviet registry. A recent ethnographic report notes that registration of marriage is far from general among the Kazakhs. There are cases in which birth registration has been delayed in order to register children by one wife in the name of another—another Kazakh device designed to circumvent the prohibition of polygamy. Similarly, practices such as leviratic marriage are maintained, concealed as much as possible from the Soviet authorities.[1]

The source for these data is a series of reports published in the past five years by the Soviet ethnographer, O.A. Korbe. He and his staff have advanced the thesis that Kazakh society in the Soviet period includes a number of institutions which have survived from pre-Soviet days. A rebuttal has been entered by another Soviet ethnographer, a Kazakh, Sabitov. Basing his report on field work in the summer of 1952, Sabitov seeks to show that rural Kazakhs have been transformed entirely by the process of Sovietization. His conclusions are supported by a certain amount of illustrative material; for example, he asserts that kolkhoz houses show Russian influence and that Russian craftsmen are employed for making stoves. Utensils used in daily life are for the most part contemporary in both design and production. Clothing, on the other hand, is in part traditional, in part modern.[2]

Sabitov's data are highly selective, for they concern only material culture—housing, dress, utensils. He merely states, without specific supporting data, that there have been changes in the social relations, the spiritual culture, and other aspects of Kazakh society. That there have been changes is obvious. Korbe stresses the traditional, the "survivals"; Sabitov stresses the new elements. Neither has examined the interrelations of Kazakh culture and society with the Russian.

Little information is available on Kazakhs living in cities. Those Kazakhs who have moved into urban areas apparently show little external difference from their Russian neighbors. They live in houses of similar architecture; photographs of KSSR cities reveal a uniform type of architecture among the apartment houses and public buildings which is an amalgam of Central Asiatic and Russian designs. Plans for feeding the cities of Kazakhstan recognize no cultural differences (see Chapter 5 on Economy). The Russian food pattern predominates: potatoes, vegetables, meat, and milk products. Kazakh dietary customs exclude pork, which is a typical Russian food carried by the Russians into Central Asia. One infers that segregation according to cultural background exists at least to a certain degree in the cities. The separation of Kazakhs from Russians is clearly not a public policy, nor is it a folk practice. The best explanation appears to be that the Kazakhs prefer to keep to themselves, and the Russians likewise.

This attitude of holding off is shown in the intermarriage pattern, or rather in the absence of one. The evidence is sparse, far from

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.
[2] Sabitov, 1953, pp. 97-99.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

1M 186 668

systematic, and subject to a number of qualifications. What data there are, however, suggest that among the people of Kazakhstan Russians marry Russians and Turks marry Turks. Again it appears that the Kazakhs do not wish to mingle with the Russians, just as, in the political domain, they do not join the Party nor engage in other political activities with the Russians. In general, on the basis of what direct evidence there is, this attitude may be summed up as noncompliance, or a kind of passive resistance. Corroborative data are seen in the economic domain, where the Kazakhs are not fulfilling plans.

THE SOVIET THEORY OF CULTURAL CHANGE

177 [21]

The theory of acculturation in anthropology has been devised to describe the social process which occurs when two different cultures come into close contact with each other. This theory has arisen out of the reflections of western European and American ethnologists on contact between their own culture and others. But there is in western civilization no general theory of culture which deals with total control of the social relations and direction of change resulting from such contact. The Russian policy toward minorities within the Soviet Union is nothing other than a theory of controlled acculturation. In their theory of history and in the formulation of their minority policy the Soviet theoreticians have proclaimed a method whereby they—and they alone—are able to control the processes of social development. They boast control over the direction in which the different peoples of the Soviet Union will change; they claim the power to dictate the manner of the change and the form that the ultimate society will take.

Starting out as a society of pastoral nomads in which membership was based on paternal kinship traced from a common male ancestor (a society also divided into aristocrats and commoners), the Kazakhs joined—or rather, were drafted into—the Soviet world. The Soviet ethnographers depict the Kazakh society as an amalgam of institutions surviving from the past, coupled with Soviet features such as collective farm organization, Party membership, and government by soviets. The survivals include the family as the unit of production and consumption, and the traditional village organization, upon which the collective farm has been superimposed. Another survival is nepotism, which is ever present in Kazakh political life. A society steeped in traditions of kinship thinks of kinship as the means for social cooperation; hence, nepotism is inherent in the very nature of Kazakh society and inevitably finds its way into the political life. But it is incompatible with the Soviet pattern and it is attacked as such.

Soviet criticism of these features, and the constant drive to eradicate them, are essential elements in the theory of controlled social and cultural change. This change originating in the contact between the Russian and the Kazakh cultures becomes a part of the general pattern of controlled acculturation. This, however, is only the theory.

In reality there is little evidence that the grand plan for social change is being carried out, or even that there is a means for carrying

101 past six centuries, are of a common origin, or not. Radlov, Grigor'ev, Veliaminov-Zernov, Ibragimov, and P. Semenov are all of the opinion that the Kirgis, both Kazakh-Kirgis and Kara-Kirgis, are of mixed origin.[5] On the other hand, Kharuzin has maintained that they are one people who have ramified into many descent groups,[6] and Aristov shares Kharuzin's view.[7] It should be added that such is the belief of the Kirgis themselves.

173 The culture history of Asia is by its nature conducive to raising problems of this sort.[1] The central [611] feature of Kazakh-Kirgis social structure is the lineage, the genealogy, the clan and tribal origin, traced in the [186] agnatic line. These pastoralists have a highly developed historical sense, and strong traditions in the matter of their origins and descent. On the other hand, for considerable periods of their history they have had their own script and records, and surrounding them have been [175] other highly literate and record-keeping cultures. Thus we have two separate historical streams, the objective history which tells us that a Kirgis group formed part of Chingis Khan's empire, that the hordes of the Kazakhs were united under Khan Tyavka in 1698, and so forth; on the other hand we have folk history--the mythical history

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[5] Radlov, Obraztsy, III; Kharuzin, K voprosu, 89.

[6] Kharuzin, op. cit., 89.

[7] Aristov, Zametki, 350 ff; Aristov, Opyt vyiasneniia, 391 ff.

1 [cf. AHI/Mongolia, Cat. IIb, pp. 262-264 -- Analyst]

173 of Fortes, the native history which counterfeits history.[8]

173 186 The mythical history divides itself into two. There is first of all the grand myth, the universal myth, which according to one of their own men of letters, states that the great ancestor, Turk, had two sons, one named Tatar, and the other Mongol.[9] This myth further affirms the Turkic descent from a primal ancestor in the direct male line; this ancestor bears the eponym of the Turkic peoples generally, that is, from this ancestor they take their name. Second, one of his sons is Tatar, the other Mongol. Thus, the Mongols are assigned an eponymous ancestry in analogous fashion to their own: the Mongols have of course a parallel myth, but one which is more flattering to themselves. The slight to the Mongols in this myth is that they are made into a junior line to the Turkic line, even as the son is junior to his father. Descent is traced in Abulgazi's account even further back, to Noah by way of Japhet,[10] and thence integrated into the Biblical and Koranic genealogies: the Kazakh-Kirgiz are an Islamic people.

173 61 The second mythical tradition is specific to the Kirgis and Kazakhs, and supplies them as such with a

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[8] Fortes, Dynamics of Clanship, pp. xi and 26; cf. also Evans-Pritchard's concept of structural time in Nuer, 1940, 94 ff.

[9] Abulgazi Ba'adur Khan, ch. 2.

[10] Idem; cf. Bichurin, I, 223 (260).

771 to them. Indifference toward religious questions
[18] will be retained by the Kazakh, however, only
until /348/ he comes into contact with more
highly developed people, that is, until external
conditions affect him. In such cases, the
Kazakh will become more exacting in regard to
religious rites and questions, since, strictly
speaking, this religiosity is nothing more
than a previously hidden feeling of nationality
expressing itself in this form.

769 Among the religious rites of the Kazakhs
veneration at the tombs of famous ancestors
and the custom of praying in the cemeteries
are very remarkable. Earlier it was not dif-
ficult to create a Kazakh saint (aulye). It
was only necessary to be a bold robber and to
leave a fine estate so that the heirs might
build a great tomb, or else to be killed in
battle. At first the tombs of such persons
were visited by descendants (rodovichami),
then, in general, all those who came, looking
at the others, also began to pray and to bring
gifts. These presents are very unimaginative,
consisting usually of many-colored rags torn
from the clothing, or of bones, especially
horns and heads. All this is thrown and spread
out on the tomb and around it, constituting
a kind of sacrificial offering reminiscent
[778] of paganism. If a tree or bush which is rare
in the steppe grows in such a place then the
holiness of the tomb is increased, and prayers
said there are considered extremely efficacious
and pious, just as oaths there are considered
particularly binding.

659 At the present time our government does
not attend to the appointment of mullahs nor
to the building of mosques for the Kazakhs.

871 somewhere into the midst of the numerous winter camps, and collect the children, almost exclusively boys, for several hours every day. The little girls learn to read and write very rarely, and only at home with their parents.
[876] The instruction consists of learning verses by heart in chorus and in a singsong voice, supplemented by dictation of Tatar phrases. In the instruction there is no unity and no definite rules. As a result it often happens that the pupils of one mullah can make out only with difficulty what is written by the pupils of another, because they have learned ortography by different rules.

674 Moral training. The evidence from juridical statistics for the nomads is very incomplete, because most of the misdemeanors and crimes remain unknown to the authorities due to the extent of the territory and the mobility
[186] of nomadic life. In addition, many crimes are concealed consciously from the Russian administration by the nomad leaders because they consider it a sufficient accounting to settle them in the native manner. Furthermore it cannot be said that justice suffers particularly because of this. In any case the people are satisfied with it and prefer a judgment according to their ancient customs to our criminal or civil court practice, which is definitely inaccesible to their concepts.

181 The character of the Kazakhs has all the qualities of the character of young nations and those, so to speak, not yet formed. In its main features their character is similar to the common Asiatic one, that is, the Kazakh has a conditional honesty and bravery as long